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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c99481.1 Labor Market Institutions and the Regulation of Labor Markets
The Committee recognizes that accomplishment of the purposes of this
bill cannot be totally achieved without the fullest cooperation of
aﬀected employees.
—Senate Report no. 91-1292, 91st Cong., 2d sess. (October 6, 1970), 10
So concluded members of the Senate in drafting the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970. Despite the fact that the new act created an ex-
tensive government enforcement system charged with improving work-
place safety and health, the architects of the act recognized the centrality
of workers to its implementation. The same might be said for a gamut of
federal and state labor market regulation from the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 to the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 to state workers com-
pensation and unemployment beneﬁt systems.
As representatives of individual employees, labor market institutions
can aﬀect the process of workplace regulation in two very diﬀerent ways.
First, they can aﬀect the political process in passing legislation and,
through executive agencies, in promulgating regulations—that is, the en-
actment of labor policies. Second, they can aﬀect the way that those laws
and regulations are enforced or administered—that is, the implementation
of laws.
There is a signiﬁcant literature on the role of interest groups in political
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cal Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.tions might play the role of “employee lobbies” in the enactment of work-
place policies. Although the speciﬁc constellation of factors that underlie
political coalitions around employment issues diﬀer from those underlying
other public policy issues, the theoretical notions bounding the creation of
such coalitions have parallels with those surrounding other areas of policy
concern.1 I, therefore, do not focus on the role for new labor market inter-
mediaries in the realm of policy enactment here.
Implementation of workplace regulations arises either from the enforce-
ment of standards created by that legislation or through the administration
of programs created by legislation. For example, the federal Davis-Bacon
Act that establishes ﬂoors for wages in the construction industry is imple-
mented by enforcement actions that either directly or, through deterrence
eﬀects, indirectly raise the wages paid by construction companies to the
“prevailing wage” set for that craft in a geographic market. Workers com-
pensation legislation is implemented via administrative activities in two
ways: through the incentive eﬀect provided by experience rating of em-
ployers covered by the system on safety policies and by the ﬁling of claims
by workers injured on the job.
Implementation—whether through enforcement or administration—
raises the question of the interaction between institutions created by labor
policies to carry out laws and the activities of workplace based institutions
that directly (e.g., unions) or indirectly (e.g., insurance companies) repre-
sent the interests of workers. To examine the need for alternative workplace
institutions in this area of labor market activity requires one to establish
what role institutions—regardless of form—play in the ﬁrst place. It then
requires one to examine the relative abilities of diﬀerent types of institu-
tions to play these roles.
This paper argues that there are two distinctive roles required for agents
in the implementation of workplace policies. First, the agent must somehow
help solve the public goods problem inherent in workplace regulation. Sec-
ond, the agent must be able to reduce the marginal cost of exercising rights
conferred to workers that are an important feature of most regulatory pro-
grams. One of the major costs in this regard is that of employer discrimina-
tion arising from exercise of those rights. Although a variety of institutions
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1. For example, Stigler (1974) explains that the signiﬁcant inﬂuence wielded by certain
small interest groups arises from their ability to surmount the free-rider problem among sup-
porters as a result of their potentially high payoﬀ from political action and the ability of
members of the coalition to sanction nonparticipants. In this view, an employment lobby rep-
resenting individual workers faces a far greater problem of funding its political activities be-
cause of the more diﬀuse beneﬁts conferred to individual workers arising from supporting the
lobby’s agenda and the diﬃculty of denying beneﬁts or instituting sanctions because of non-
participation. Unions address this free-rider problem by allocating a portion of dues revenues
to political activities directed toward workplace issues (see Masters 1997 for a recent discus-
sion). Whether other institutions can play a comparable role is discussed in Hersch (chap. 6
in this volume).may be capable of stepping into the fray and serving as agents in the enact-
ment of legislation, the roles required for implementation are more diﬃcult
to embody in a labor market agent. Laying out the theoretical requirements
for such agents focuses attention on the features of “emerging labor market
institutions” most important to the implementation of workplace policies.
This chapter begins with a discussion of federal labor regulations in the
United States and the roles they establish for workers through the provi-
sion of individually based worker rights. It then presents a model concern-
ing the decision by workers to exercise those rights. Based on insights from
the model, it analyzes the requirements of workplace institutions in ful-
ﬁlling those roles. The third section evaluates a variety of labor market in-
stitutions—beginning with labor unions as a benchmark—that potentially
serve the role as agents. Based on this evaluation, the paper concludes with
a discussion of how policies might be adapted to foster agents better able
to serve the two central roles of labor market intermediaries in implement-
ing labor regulations.
1.2 Individual Rights and the Need for Collective Agents
1.2.1 Federal Regulations and the Importance of Worker Rights
A complex web of laws and executive orders cover employment practices
in U.S. workplaces. In most areas of workplace regulation, a division of the
U.S. Department of Labor (e.g., the Wage and Hour Division; the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA]) acts as the enforce-
ment agent for regulatory policies. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)
exercises its authority either because of a legislative mandate providing it
jurisdiction over all private sector workplaces or authority granted it aris-
ing from government’s role as a major purchaser of services and products.
The task of the DOL is to ascertain whether an employer is conducting hu-
man resource policies in a manner consistent with regulatory programs
and then to change the behavior of those ﬁrms that are not. The majority
of workplace regulations provide the DOL or other enforcement agents
with a variety of civil and, in some cases, criminal sanctions to provide in-
centives to change behavior.
The behavioral model embodied in most federal labor policies is gaining
employer adherence to standards primarily via the threat of inspection,
compulsion, and ﬁnes. Adherence with regulations is secured either through
the direct pressure arising from inspection activities (triggered either by the
agency or covered workers) or through deterrence eﬀects and the conse-
quent voluntary decision to comply with labor policies. Thus, ﬁrms are
assumed to act in accordance with the model of crime initially set out by
Becker (1968) where crime (or here regulatory noncompliance) is a de-
creasing function of the return to crime or the avoidance of costs arising
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ers will choose not to comply with a labor regulation if it is easy to escape
detection and/or because assessed penalties in the event of being detected
are small.
The objectives of labor legislation and executive orders are therefore
translated into practice via enforcement. There are three ways that enforce-
ment can be undertaken under labor regulation: (1) the responsible gov-
ernment agency can initiate enforcement; (2) employees can initiate
enforcement (via rights provided them); or (3) a mix of the previously
mentioned, where employees trigger enforcement, bring government ac-
tion, and/or use private rights through the courts. There is considerable di-
vergence between the enforcement implied in statutes to actual enforce-
ment as carried out in practice. For example, OSHA’s inspection force has
never exceeded 1,500 and currently hovers around 1,100. Resource limita-
tions substantially lower the probability that a workplace will be inspected
in a given year by the government. The annual probability of receiving an
inspection for one of the 6.5 million establishments covered by OSHA is
well below .001. Similarly, penalties under many statutes are relatively low.
The ability of government agencies to fulﬁll their legislative mandates solely
through enforcement is therefore limited. For this reason, the role of work-
ers under workplace policies takes on great importance.
Federal workplace regulations provide employees with important roles
directly aﬀecting the implementation of those statutes. Much of workplace
regulation dating back to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938
and going forward to the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) passed al-
most sixty years later provides workers with an opportunity to participate
in one or more aspects of the regulatory process.2 Most important of those
rights is that of triggering regulatory activity itself. Although the right to
trigger inspections dates back to some of the earliest state-level labor leg-
islation (Common and Andrews 1936), regulations promulgated during
the two most recent surges of workplace legislation or executive orders (in
1963–1974 and 1986–1993) have increased the number of regulations pro-
viding workers with a right to initiate civil actions under such laws as Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (PPA), and the Workers Adjust-
ment and Retraining and Notiﬁcation Act (WARN). This has resulted in
an enormous increase in the number of cases ﬁled under employment law,
relative to other categories of litigation.3
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2. Table 1A.1 provides a listing of the name, acronym, date of passage, and brief descrip-
tion of all of the regulations discussed in this paper.
3. This can be seen in the relative growth in ﬁve categories of employment related lawsuits
ﬁled in federal district courts between 1971 and 1991. The fastest-growing category in relative
terms over the period has been litigation on employment law, which went in absolute terms
from 4,331 cases ﬁled in 1971 to 22,968 cases in 1991. As a result, employment law went fromTable 1.1 depicts a subset of these roles under federal workplace regula-
tions: the right to initiate an agency action and the right to pursue private
action in courts either as the ﬁrst step in seeking to change employer be-
havior or after administrative remedies have been exhausted. Most federal
legislation also establishes reporting/disclosure requirements that seek to
inform employees of their rights, employer duties, or employer perfor-
mance under the statute (these are depicted in the ﬁnal two columns of
table 1.1). In addition to these rights, many workplace statutes enumerate
employee rights regarding participation in various stages of the regulatory
process, such as by providing workers (or their designated representatives)
with a right to accompany government oﬃcials during inspections (Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act [OSHAct], Mine Safety and Health Act
[MSHA] and to appeal decisions or participate in hearings arising from in-
spections (OSHA, MSHA, Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards
Act [CWHSSA]).
There is little reason to believe that workers uniformly exercise rights
granted them under labor policies. Studies in several diﬀerent areas indi-
cate that the propensity to exercise rights varies along systematic lines
across diﬀerent groups. A number of empirical studies have shown diﬀer-
ent propensities for individuals to litigate civil claims (see, for example,
Hoyman and Stallworth 1981; Shavell 1987). Other studies have docu-
mented factors aﬀecting workers’ use of grievance procedures in union and
nonunion workplaces (Peterson 1992; Feuille and Delaney 1992; Chachere
and Feuille 1993). This literature suggests that factors related to the in-
dividual (sex, education, demographic background), the workplace envi-
ronment (size, degree of conﬂict, management and union policies), and 
the speciﬁc grievance or civil problem involved aﬀect under what circum-
stances individuals use their rights. Given limited government resources
for enforcement, the conditions under which employees exercise their
rights either to initiate suits or agency action fundamentally aﬀect achieve-
ment of policy goals in the workplace. In a somewhat diﬀerent vein, labor
market programs, such as workers compensation and unemployment in-
surance, require that workers initiate the process leading to the issuance of
beneﬁts provided by those programs.
1.2.2 A Threshold Model of the Exercise of Individual Rights
The degree to which individual employees exercise rights granted them
under labor regulations can be expected to depend on the perceived be-
neﬁts versus the costs of exercising rights from the perspective of an indi-
vidual worker. The beneﬁts of exercising a right are a function of the
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comprising about 6 percent of the 69,465 civil cases ﬁled in federal district courts in 1971 to
about 16 percent of the 146,790 civil cases ﬁled in 1991. These ﬁgures are reported in Com-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.impact of labor legislation on the outcome of concern to the worker. For
example, initiating an OSHA inspection potentially improves working
conditions for the worker by diminishing or removing the risk of an injury
or illness. The greater the level of perceived risk faced by the worker, the
more likely they are to initiate an inspection or otherwise seek to aﬀect re-
dress of the problem. Similarly, the greater the divergence between the
wages paid to workers and the wages that they are entitled to under the law
(e.g., because of premium pay required for overtime), the more likely a
worker is to exercise rights to initiate actions under the FLSA.
In order to ascertain the magnitude of these beneﬁts, workers must ac-
quire information on the currentand legally permissiblelevel of a regulated
outcome. The costs of exercising rights are primarily a function of the costs
of gathering this information. These are composed of costs associated with
(1) obtaining information regarding the existence of basic rights as well as
the standards to which employers are held accountable;4 (2) gathering
information on the current state of workplace conditions—a particular
problem if the risks are complex as in the case of safety and health (Viscusi
1983; Viscusi and O’Connor 1984); and (3) learning about the speciﬁc de-
tails of how the law is administered (e.g., the procedures to initiate a com-
plaint inspection). In addition to information-related costs, workers face
signiﬁcant costs arising from potential employer retaliation (the economic
losses associated with retaliatory reassignment or, in the extreme, being
ﬁred)5 as well as the potential cost of job loss arising from the chance that
compliance will force a ﬁrm to reduce employment in the long run.
The decision facing a worker on whether to exercise a right is represented
diagrammatically in ﬁgure 1.1. The horizontal axis, Xj represents the diﬀer-
ence between current workplace conditions (e.g., exposure to a health risk;
actual wage rate for hours of work) and the regulatory standard for that
workplace outcome for workplace j. The value of Xj is deﬁned where
Xj   0 if the current workplace provides conditions above permissible
levels (i.e., the ﬁrm goes beyond compliance required by the
standard);
Xj   0 if the current workplace provides conditions equal to the required
levels (i.e., the ﬁrm is exactly in compliance with the law); and
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4. This is a recurring problem under workplace regulation. For example, a survey of OSHA
compliance oﬃcers by the U.S. GAO concluded that “many OSHA inspectors believe work-
ers’ participation [in OSHA] is limited by their lack of knowledge about their rights and lack
of protection from employer reprisal” (U.S. GAO 1989). The decline in the take-up rate for
unemployment insurance has been partly ascribed to the lack of information to workers
about their access to unemployment beneﬁts (Wandner and Skinner 2000). Freeman and
Rogers (1999, chap. 6) also present survey evidence indicating pervasive worker mispercep-
tions regarding their rights under employment and labor laws.
5. The costs of retaliation may be even more severe, such as in the well-known 1996 case of
apparel workers in El Monte, California, held in virtual captivity by their employer who used
physical intimidation to prevent the workers from leaving.Xj   0 if the current workplace provides conditions below permissible
levels (i.e., the ﬁrm is out compliance).
This means that as Xjincreases, a workplace falls further out of compliance
with the regulatory requirement. In the case of health and safety regula-
tions, this means that as Xj increases, worker exposure to risk increasingly
goes beyond the risk levels if workplaces compiled with standards; for reg-
ulations related to compensation like FLSA or Davis-Bacon, this means
that actual pay increasingly falls below that required under the statute. For
a program like workers compensation, increases in Xj imply that the earn-
ings received by the injured worker diverge more and more from those he
or she is entitled by the program.
Given this deﬁnition of Xj, the ﬁgure presents two marginal-beneﬁt func-
tions. The lower function (MBi) represents the marginal worker iin a work-
place j who has the highest individual preference for compliance with the
regulatory standard. As such, this function represents the worker who will
ﬁrst exercise his or her statutory right in the workplace. I assume that the
marginal beneﬁt of exercising a right that moves the ﬁrm into greater com-
pliance with the standard is positive and increasing in Xj.
Because a violation of a workplace standard typically aﬀects many
workers and is often associated with violations of other standards that
might not directly aﬀect the worker triggering the inspection, employee ex-
ercise of workplace rights displays positive externalities. Because of this,
the marginal beneﬁt for the workplace as a whole is always higher than that
of the marginal worker for any Xj. The upper marginal-beneﬁt function in
Figure 1.1 represents workers at the workplace as a whole (MBj) and 
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Fig. 1.1 Threshold model of employee exercise of rightsreﬂects the vertical aggregation of beneﬁts for all aﬀected workers for any
given state Xj.6
Figure 1.1 ﬁrst presents a simple case where the costs of exercising a right
are invariant across the diﬀerent levels of Xj and the same for an individual
worker as they are for the workplace as a whole (the upper line, where
MC
I MCj). If rights are vested at the individual level, worker iwill choose
to exercise the rights at the state of the workplace Xi∗), where MBi   MCi.
Given that the decision is made by the marginal worker with the greatest
preference for workplace conditions consonant with regulatory standards
(i.e., the lowest tolerance for current conditions being out of compliance),
Xi∗ represents the level of noncompliance that will trigger the exercise of
rights for that workplace when left to the decision of this “threshold” indi-
vidual worker.
Given the public good character of the beneﬁts ensuing from the exercise
of rights, Xi∗ is not optimal for the workplace as a whole because the mar-
ginal worker decides only on the basis of his or her individual preference.
Accounting for all workers in the workplace, the optimal threshold in ﬁg-
ure 1.1 is Xj∗, where Xi∗ Xj∗. That is, the exercise of right taken at the indi-
vidual level leads to a “higher” threshold (i.e., current conditions being
more out of compliance with standards) than the threshold that would pre-
vail if the preferences of all workers were considered. Workplace rights,
therefore, will be underutilized because the collective beneﬁts arising from
their action are not factored into the individual decision.
If the cost of exercising a right exhibits increasing returns to scale, such
as because of eﬃciencies gained from collecting information at the work-
place, or multiworkplace level, the divergence between threshold for an
individual versus collective group of workers grow even further. Protec-
tions against discrimination for exercise of rights aﬀorded by a method of
collectively exercising rights may represent a second reason that the mar-
ginal cost of exercise may be far lower for a group of workers. In either
case, this situation is depicted in ﬁgure 1.1 as MCj , the lower dotted hor-
izontal line, which is below the marginal-cost function faced by an indi-
vidual. The collective threshold for exercise of rights now occurs at Xj∗∗,
arising in an even larger gap from the individual threshold for exercising
the right, Xi∗.
Thus, the problem arising from the structure of workplace regulations is
that if left to the individual worker, the threshold for exercise of rights lies
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6. The degree to which MBi diverges from MBj will diﬀer across workplace regulations. For
example, there are greater divergences between the functions for regulations like OSHA,
FLSA, or policies dealing with discrimination where the risks or problems faced by one
worker will likely be more pervasive and therefore aﬀect many other workers as well. In con-
trast, under beneﬁt programs like workers compensation or unemployment, the spillovers are
likely much smaller because the program primarily confers beneﬁts to the worker directly
aﬀected. The implications of these diﬀerences are discussed in section 1.3.above the threshold optimal from the workplace—and societal—level. In
order to close this gap, one must surmount the problems of (1) aggregating
preferences across workers and (2) reducing the marginal cost of exercise
of those rights.
1.2.3 Workplace Agents and the Exercise of Rights
A collective workplace agent can potentially solve the problem de-
scribed previously. It can do so ﬁrst by internalizing the positive external-
ity to workers arising from a claim as a representative of all workers in the
unit. A workplace agent can also gather and disseminate information,
thereby lowering the cost of information acquisition faced by individuals.
The speciﬁc elements required of such an agent are straightforward and
ﬂow from the threshold model in ﬁgure 1.1:
1. Interests aligned with workers—speciﬁcally an interest in represent-
ing the collective preferences of workers in regard to working conditions
2. A means of eﬃciently gathering and disseminating information on
rights, administrative procedures, and the nature of workplace risks
3. A method of providing protection from employer discrimination
against individual workers for their exercise of rights
The need for an agent to play these roles points to a conundrum embedded
in many workplace regulations. Although most of the policies listed in
table 1.1 create rights focused on the individual worker, social eﬃciency is
enhanced where individually basedrights are exercised via an agent operat-
ing in the collective interest.
The previous discussion also raises a related issue often overlooked in ex-
amining workplace regulation. One cannot detach the role of “command
and control” regulatory systems from the operation of labor market insti-
tutions, even where labor market intermediaries are not explicitly set out in
the legislation as the explicit agent for implementation. It is often assumed
that under traditional regulatory structures, the government alone acts as
the agent of enforcement. Yet as the review of labor regulations and the
threshold model indicates, implementing workplace policies includes a
role for workers and in that way for labor market intermediaries. The fact
that an important avenue for enforcement of those laws is the exercise of
individual rights belies a more complex interaction built into the structure
of regulatory systems.
1.3 Alternative Labor Market Institutions
1.3.1 Unions and the Enforcement of Labor Policies
While a number of diﬀerent arrangements can potentially satisfy the
conditions for a workplace agent, labor unions potentially fulﬁll many of
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veyors of workplace-based public goods regarding labor policies both by
internalizing the beneﬁts relating to worker exercise of rights across work-
ers in the unit and by lowering the costs of information acquisition.
As the elected representative of workers, a union has incentives to act on
behalf of the collective interests of members in the bargaining unit. This
means that a union will not base perceptions of the beneﬁt of pursuing a
claim under laws based on the preferences of an individual worker at the
margin but on inframarginal evaluations of those beneﬁts. In facing this
allocation problem, a union can vertically aggregate preferences for the
“public goods” represented by workplace regulations, following the model
of public goods seminally described in Samuelson (1955).8
Unions can eﬃciently gather and disseminate information on the exis-
tence of workplace laws and rights created by those laws. Unions provide
this information formally through educational programs, in apprentice-
ship training, or through supplying educational materials. Informally,
union leaders or staﬀ can alert members of their rights when a problem or
issue arises. Unions also provide information on the existence of speciﬁc
underlying problems, particularly in the area of safety and health (see Vis-
cusi 1983). This information may be collected and disseminated through
formal programs or channels or informally via the union structure or fel-
low workers.
Unions also oﬀer individual workers assistance in the actual exercise of
their rights. This may result from the operation of committees established
under collective bargaining, as is common in safety and health, or via the
help of union staﬀ who can trigger inspections, oversee pension fund in-
vestments, or assist members ﬁle unemployment claims. Most important,
unions can substantially reduce the costs associated with potential em-
ployer discrimination by helping aﬀected employees to use antidiscrimina-
tion provisions of the labor policies and providing this protection via col-
lective bargaining agreements regulating dismissals. The formal protection
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7. Williamson (1985, 254) points out, “[u]nions can both serve as a source of information
regarding employee needs and preferences.” In addition to Williamson, the role of unions in
providing basic agency functions is discussed in Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984), particularly in
regard to personnel practices and beneﬁts.
8. There might also be divergences in behavior arising from a number of sources. Median
voter models of union behavior would predict that union leadership would tend to pursue
policies reﬂective of more senior members of the unit which might not be synonymous with
the public goods solution to beneﬁt valuation. Alternatively, principal/agent divergences in
interest may also lead away from optimal behaviors from the perspective of collective worker
interests. For example, the union may have incentives to “overuse” certain rights for strategic
reasons unrelated to the workplace regulation, for example, as a source of pressure in collec-
tive bargaining or strikes (U.S. GAO 2000). However, principal/agent divergences in behavior
may be moderated both through electoral processes and by worker recourse via duty of fair
representation claims that tend to induce unions to pursue activities consonant with the pref-
erences of represented workers.oﬀered by a collective agreement provides security unavailable in the vast
majority of nonunion workplaces, even where a grievance procedure exists
(Feuille and Delaney 1992).
There might also be divergences in behavior between workers and
unions arising from a number of sources. Median voter models of union
behavior would predict that union leadership would tend to pursue poli-
cies reﬂective of more senior members of the unit that might not be syn-
onymous with the public goods solution to beneﬁt valuation. Alternatively,
principal/agent divergences in interest may also lead away from optimal
behaviors from the perspective of collective worker interests. For example,
a union may have incentives to exercise certain rights for strategic reasons
unrelated to the workplace regulation, for example, as a source of pressure
in collective bargaining or strikes (U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce [GAO]
2000). Similarly, there might be cases where the political incentive of union
leaders compels them to take adversarial positions toward management to
enhance their position with respect to union members key to electoral suc-
cess but precluding the union from achieving longer term solutions that
might be welfare enhancing to workers (members and nonmembers) as a
whole. For example, a union’s corporate campaign that publicly exposes
management’s failure to adhere to the letter of the FMLA as part of a
larger eﬀort to increase collective bargaining strength might preclude the
union and management from achieving more creative and ﬂexible solu-
tions regarding leave policies in the future.9
As such, some of the exercise of rights associated with unionization in
table 1.2 might not be welfare enhancing to the extent that it pushes work-
ers away from desirable resolution of their workplace problems. However,
it should also be noted that systematic principal/agent divergences in be-
havior between unions and workers may be moderated through electoral
processes and by worker recourse via duty of fair representation claims,
both of which tend to induce unions to pursue activities more consonant
with the preferences of represented workers.
In any event, union activity on behalf of the collective preferences of the
workers in the bargaining unit can be expected to induce greater usage of
rights. This leads to a testable empirical hypothesis: government labor
market policies should be more fully implemented in unionized work-
places than in otherwise comparable nonunion workplaces. This hypothe-
sis can be tested by examining empirical studies of labor market regula-
tions that have measured union/nonunion diﬀerences in implementation.
Table 1.2 summarizes evidence of union impacts on both enforcement
and compliance under a wide array of labor policies. It conﬁrms the
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9. This has been a recurring critique of corporate campaign tactics that rely on exposing
management violations of various labor policies in the course of organizing or collective-
bargaining eﬀorts.Table 1.2 Impact of labor unions on enforcement and compliance with workplace regulations
Labor statute or  Union impact  Union impact on 
executive order on enforcement employer compliance Study
Fair Labor  Inclusion of premium pay  Increase the probability  Enforcement: Bureau of 
Standards Act— for overtime standard in  of compliance for union- National Aﬀairs ([BNA] 
Overtime  collective agreements ized workers 1997)
Provisions Compliance: Ehrenberg 
and Schumann (1982); 
Trejo (1991)
ERISA Increase in degree of  Require more strict adher- Enforcement: Langbert 
scrutiny over eligible  ence to eligibility and  (1995)
pension plans ﬁnancial management  Compliance: Freeman 
standards by employers (1985)
OSHA Higher inspection proba- Higher rates of compli- Enforcement: Weil (1991, 
bilities; longer inspections;  ance with speciﬁc OSHA  1992)
shorter abatement dura- standards Compliance: Weil (1996)
tion; higher penalties
MSHA Higher inspection proba- n.a. Weil (1990)
bilities; longer/more in-
tense inspections; shorter 
abatement duration; 
higher penalties
EO 11246 No impact on probability  n.a. Leonard (1985)
of receiving a federal con-
tract compliance review
WARN Increase in the probabil- No impact on the proba- Enforcement: U.S. GAO 
ity of ﬁling suit under  bility of providing advance  (1993); Ehrenberg and 
WARN notice to aﬀected workers Jakubson (1990)
Compliance: Addison 
and Blackburn (1994)
ADA n.a. Raise probability that  Stern and Balser (1996)
ﬁrms comply with four 
core practices required by 
ADA
FMLA Improved information to  Increase probability that  Budd and Brey (2000)
workers regarding rights  leave was fully paid by 
and eligibility under  employer as provided
FMLA
Workers  n.a. Increase in probability of  Butler and Worrall (1983); 
Compensation ﬁlings for beneﬁts among  Hirsch, Macpherson, and 
eligible workers and bene- DuMond (1997)
ﬁt levels for given disabil-
ity level
Unemployment  n.a. Increase in the probability  Blank and Card (1991); 
Compensation of ﬁling for beneﬁts among  Budd and McCall (1997, 
eligible workers 2004) 
Note: n.a.   not available.predicted presence of systematic diﬀerences between union versus non-
union enforcement and compliance outcomes across diverse labor regula-
tions and workplace policies. This includes regulations dating back to early
labor legislation like the FLSA, where unions appreciably raise the proba-
bility of compliance with premium pay for overtime. Unions also increase
an array of enforcement outcomes and compliance with health and safety
standards under both OSHA and MSHA as well as provisions of the Em-
ployee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA). Unions also raise
enforcement and compliance under some of the newest labor policies, such
as WARN, ADA, and FMLA. Finally, unions substantially increase the
probability that workers will receive beneﬁts that they are eligible for under
the two major workplace programs administered at the state level: unem-
ployment insurance and workers compensation.10Thus, with the exception
of their neutral impact on contract compliance reviews under Executive
Order 11246, empirical studies of labor market enforcement indicate that
unions act as agents that assist employee exercise of rights.
This review suggests that unions can address the major factors leading
to a divergence between individual and collective exercise of rights under
many diﬀerent regulatory policies, albeit with potential principal/agent
problems between members and unions that might diminish social welfare
under certain circumstances. As a result, the role of unions as agents pro-
vides a useful benchmark to compare other potential parties that might
play this role in the absence of union presence at the workplace.
How do other labor market intermediaries stack up in solving the prob-
lem posed by the individual versus collective exercise of rights? We evalu-
ate six potential intermediaries in the following, each evaluated along the
same dimensions developed in section 1.2. The following sections do not
provide an exhaustive review of these mechanisms, many of which are dis-
cussed elsewhere in this volume. The intention instead is to examine each
of the alternatives against the three dimensions described previously and
indicate the relative strengths and weaknesses of each. This provides an an-
alytic backdrop for the other papers that look into some of these mecha-
nisms in greater depth.
1.3.2 National Issue Organizations and Legal Service Organizations
Christine Jolls (chap. 4 in this volume) describes the activities of national
issue organizations that deal at least in part with employment law (e.g.,
American Civil Liberties Union; National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People Legal Defense Fund; National Employment Law
Project) and legal service organizations (primarily the organizations ad-
ministered by the Legal Services Corporation, created by Congress in
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10. This latter eﬀect of unions as workplace agents is particularly important given the long-
term decline in beneﬁt recipiency under these programs (Wandner and Skinner 2000).1974) as alternative institutions that assist employees exercise their rights.
The role of national issue and legal service organizations lie either in terms
of their impact on the public goods problem or in lowering the costs of ex-
ercise of rights (including the costs arising from employer discrimination).
Both types of organizations can act on the public goods aspect of the
problem to the extent that they can serve as an agent to aggregate prefer-
ences for collective actions or lead workers to do so. One obvious mecha-
nism for legal organizations to do so is by undertaking class action suits on
behalf of groups of workers. Illustrative of this role are several recent cases
of legal organizations doing so on behalf of agricultural workers and ap-
parel workers in regard to violations arising under the FLSA.
What incentives and capacities do these organizations have to play this
role? The evidence presented in Jolls suggests that the nature of funding for
the two organizations creates incentives that lead both organizations away
from the role of solving the workplace public goods problem. National in-
terest organizations tend to focus on fundraising and involvement in high-
proﬁle litigation focused on setting larger legal precedent. Legal service or-
ganizations, in contrast, tend to focus on speciﬁc cases that arise from
individuals coming to those organizations. Thus, national interest organi-
zations focus on “high-proﬁle, publicly charged issues . . . [working on] a
few . . . inﬂuential cases,” while legal service organizations “tend to work
on many routine cases” (Jolls, chap. 4 in this volume).
The diﬀerent character of the subject matter of legal activities suggests a
fundamental agency problem in both organizations that may reduce their
abilities to play a role analogous to labor unions in the workplace. National
interest organizations act at least in part as agents of their principal sources
of funding—private donors and foundations. Those parties seek to maxi-
mize their investment (donations or grants) in terms of public impact (or
at least perceptions of public impact). This tends to push those organiza-
tions away from workplace-level interventions and toward cases involving
major precedent and public controversy.
Legal service organizations, in contrast, are agents of their very diﬀerent
funding source, the U.S. Congress. Although Congress cannot be consid-
ered a principal with a single utility function, Jolls’s evidence is consistent
with a story that the long-term coalition necessary to sustain funding is one
where the median congressional voter seeks to focus those organizations
on the modest goal of lowering the cost faced by low-income individuals in
pursuing civil claims. The median congressional voter, however, has his-
torically rejected the notion that legal services should act as an agent for
larger groupings of individuals.11 In this view, legal service organizations
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11. Jolls (chap. 4 in this volume) cites a number of examples of Congress curtailing class ac-
tion activity by legal service attorneys. The median voter hypothesis advanced here could be
more rigorously tested by examining changes in legal service activities over time given shifts
in political coalitions in Congress.might lower the marginal cost of exercise of rights, but only on an ad hoc
basis, driven by the individual worker decision to approach legal services
for assistance in the ﬁrst place.
1.3.3 Other Public Interest Organizations
There are many other public interest groups that have been organized to
deal with the workplace issues, with less focus on legal assistance than the
organizations studied by Jolls. These include Committees on Safety and
Health (COSH) groups, organized in a number of states and focused on
safety and health; disabled workers groups focused on issues of workers
compensation, the ADA, and, to a lesser extent, OSHA; and groups fo-
cused on workplace regulations aﬀecting low-wage workers in speciﬁc in-
dustries (e.g., “sweatshop” problems in apparel; child labor problems in
agriculture or retail). One activity of many of these groups is lobbying and
participating in legislative and executive forums at the state and federal
level. In this capacity, they attempt to aﬀect either the enactment of laws
and regulations or appropriations toward existing programs as opposed to
the implementation issues of central interest here (see Hersch, chap. 6 in
this volume, for discussion of the role of new labor market institutions on
legislative enactment).
However, a second set of activities pursued by these groups is direct
worker assistance. In the 1970s, for example, many COSH groups formed
in states to provide information and assistance to workers under OSHA.
The intention of many of these groups was to provide workers—in partic-
ular nonunion workers—with information regarding their rights under the
newly passed act. A comparable group was formed for nonunion miners to
assist them exercise rights under MSHA (McAteer 1985).
These groups tend to receive their donations from a mix of labor unions
(a signiﬁcant source of funding for COSH and disabled worker groups in
particular), foundations, and individual workers or donors. The impor-
tance of labor unions as a funding source as well as small donors (often
those with a personal connection to the issue) tends to lessen the agency
problem discussed in regard to either national interest or legal service or-
ganizations. This potentially leads to better alignment between the objec-
tives of the groups and those of the workers they intend to assist.12
The main diﬃculty facing these groups is that they operate outside of the
workplace, although one of their intentions is to help solve the public
Individual Rights and Collective Agents 29
12. This is not to argue that the alignment between these organizations and workers is as
close as found in the case of labor unions. For example, donors to COSH or disabled worker
groups may be similarly interested in “large impacts,” such as those funding national interest
organizations, which may skew institutional activities in a similar manner. The importance of
union funds may also lead these organizations to direct their resources toward certain
nonunion workplaces of strategic interest to unions. Even more, union funding could lead
COSH groups to devote their resources supplementing the activities of unions in already or-
ganized workplaces. There is some evidence of the latter behavior described in the following.goods problem that exists within it. This limits their potential impact on
the exercise of rights primarily to an informational role—that is, toward re-
ducing the marginal costs of exercise of rights. However, even here their im-
pact is modest: their lack of presence at the work site means that they can
have limited impact on the threat of discrimination arising from exercise of
rights, perhaps the highest cost facing workers. It is noteworthy that COSH
groups in many states have concentrated much of their eﬀorts over time in
their work in conjunction with unions and unionized workplaces, where
they take advantage of an established agent (comparable to the eﬀects of
workplace committees described in the following).13
The threshold problem presented by workers compensation and unem-
ployment insurance is somewhat diﬀerent than that posed by OSHA or
MSHA. Here, the public goods aspects of providing information and as-
sistance regarding beneﬁts are somewhat less than in regulatory programs
(that is, the beneﬁts provided by the program look less like public goods).
The threshold problem therefore arises more from the diﬀerence between
the marginal costs of disseminating information to workers on a collective
versus individual basis. The potential for employer discrimination is also
much less for these beneﬁt programs, in part because their ﬁnancing (and,
therefore, the potential costs to employers) is disconnected from the provi-
sion of beneﬁts. As a result, the network of disabled worker organizations
can potentially play a more fruitful role—outside of the workplace—in
providing information on the availability of beneﬁts and assistance in ﬁl-
ing claims. Although alternative institutions potentially could assist work-
ers in the area of unemployment insurance in a comparable way, there is an
absence of a large network of such organizations in this realm.14
1.3.4 Mandated Workplace Committees
A number of U.S. states mandate that employers establish workplace
safety and health committees. Mandated workplace committees poten-
tially can play an important regulatory role because they can have better
and more timely information about prevailing health and safety condi-
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13. Indicative of this is the history of “New Directions” grants provided by OSHA in the
1970s and 1980s that provided ﬁnancial assistance for promotion of private health and safety
programs. The majority of these grants went either to unions or to joint COSH-union initia-
tives.
14. Diﬀerences in the presence of worker groups to assist disabled workers versus unem-
ployed workers once again raises the economics of interest group formation discussed by
Stigler (1974) and others. The longevity of the eﬀects of workplace disability as opposed to
the transient nature of unemployment creates greater incentives for the formation of sustain-
able organizations concerning the former issue and the diﬃculty of sustaining organizations
(particularly over the course of business cycles) in the latter area. Thus, to the extent that
workers groups have formed over the latter issue, they have been linked to industries facing
periods of intense crisis (e.g., steel) or deep recessions. After crises pass (or industry restruc-
turing occurs and workers ﬁnd other employment) these groups tend to disband. See Hoerr
(1988) for a discussion of these types of assistance groups in the steel industry.tions. In addition, committees might be able to reach agreement with man-
agement about resolving particular workplace problems that are better tai-
lored to underlying conditions than might an outside government regulator
who must conform to more general standards or procedures (Rogers 1995).
Workplace committees conceivably fulﬁll the two roles for a workplace
intermediary for implementing labor policies. First, by being mandated by
the government (rather than voluntarily adopted by employers), the com-
mittee can serve as an agent of employees at the workplace. In this way, it
has an intrinsic interest in vertically aggregating preferences for the public
goods created by workplace regulations. Second, a well-functioning com-
mittee can provide information on worker rights, workplace conditions,
and administrative procedures, thereby lowering MCj. Finally, a work-
place committee might also provide a protective shield for individual work-
ers who might be more inclined to report problems before, during, or after
inspections than they would in the absence of such committees. As a result,
mandated committee structures potentially fulﬁll the major roles described
previously.
The primary question in evaluating workplace committees concerns
whether mandated committees function eﬀectively. One major concern
comes back to the agency problem: if workers view the committee prima-
rily as a creature of the employer, the nature of the agency relation between
the committee and workers is weakened, and it will be less eﬀective in its
public goods provision role as well as in lowering the perceived costs aris-
ing from discrimination. A second question concerns its capacities to un-
dertake activities eﬀectively (even if it functions independently of the em-
ployer). This will aﬀect its ability to appreciably lower the marginal costs
of exercising rights.
The experience of mandated health and safety committees in the state of
Oregon provide one indication of the determinants of their eﬀectiveness.
Weil (1999) examines the impact of committee mandates on the union
eﬀect on OSHA enforcement. Comparing OSHA inspection outcomes for
two years preceding and following implementation of committee man-
dates, he ﬁnds that mandated committees signiﬁcantly increase the diﬀer-
ential between union and nonunion enforcement, arising from consider-
able strengthening of enforcement activity in union workplaces and only
modest increases in enforcement in nonunion workplaces. The only excep-
tion to this is in the case of large nonunion establishments where commit-
tees have more appreciable impacts on enforcement activity.
The results suggest that mandated committees do not represent a simple
solution to the problem of ﬁnding alternative workplace institutions to
help implement labor policies. Eﬀectiveness in ﬁlling the roles laid out in
ﬁgure 1.1 is a function of at least two factors. First, the regulations man-
dating committees in the ﬁrst place must allow the establishment of inde-
pendent workplace structures. Safety and health committee mandates vary
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which they are established (see Bernard 1995; Reilly, Paci, and Holl 1995;
Rogers 1995; U.S. GAO 1992). Second, committee eﬀectiveness is related
to antecedent conditions in the workplace itself, in particular characteris-
tics of workforce that aﬀect committees’ capacity to take on its activities as
well as its ability to function independently. In addition to the size of the
workplace, factors might include worker turnover, skill and education
level, and factors aﬀecting informal worker organization.
1.3.5 Third-Party Monitors
In recent years, the use of third-party monitors as regulatory agents has
been discussed as a possible solution to limited government enforcement
resources. Proposals for the use of third-party monitors (such as account-
ing ﬁrms) in the area of safety and health gained public attention and be-
came the subject of criticism when it appeared as part of Vice President Al
Gore’s “Reinventing Government” proposals for the federal sector.
In more recent years, third-party monitors have been used as part of in-
novative eﬀorts for enforcing the FLSA provisions on minimum wage and
overtime in the U.S. apparel industry. In particular, the DOL has secured
agreement by apparel manufacturers to use third parties to monitor as-
pects of compliance with the FLSA as part of larger settlement agreements
with the DOL. The role of these monitors is to be able to conduct surprise
inspections on behalf of the manufacturer among subcontractors used by
the manufacturer. The results of the inspections can be used by the manu-
facturer to monitor cases where noncompliant contractors are violating
the act, thereby exposing the manufacturer to civil penalties and, more im-
portantly, supply disruptions (U.S. Department of Labor 1999).
Monitors can either be drawn from the private sector (accounting ﬁrms;
for-proﬁt enterprises speciﬁcally created for this function) or the not-for-
proﬁt sector (that is, independent organizations created to act as work-
place monitors). In the case of monitors created under “Compliance Pro-
gram Agreements” between the DOL and apparel manufacturers, their
structure, funding, and activities are negotiable, although the DOL has
“model provisions” that it encourages manufacturers to adopt (U.S. De-
partment of Labor 1998).
The agency relations of third-party monitors are complex in that—at
least on paper—they act as agents of government. However, in reality they
are agents of other private parties who have an interest in allowing them to
take on certain quasi-governmental activity. In the area of apparel, third-
party monitors are usually the agents of manufacturers who use them to
monitor their subcontractors in terms of compliance with minimum wage
and overtime laws required by FLSA. Manufacturers have the incentive to
agree to use such outside monitors to ensure that their sewing contractors
comply with labor standards because of concern that noncompliance with
32 David Weillaws can lead their goods to be embargoed by the DOL. Resulting delays
in shipments to retailers can have costly consequences to the manufacturer
(Weil 2002). As a result, the interests of third-party monitors, though
agents of the manufacturer, are also aligned to some extent with those of
the government.15
Third-party monitors, then, may help deal with the threshold gap de-
picted in ﬁgure 1.1 more in their capacity to supplement the enforcement
activities of the DOL than in their potential role as an institutional agent
for workers. Although the presence of a third-party monitor raises the
probability that a given workplace will be inspected and that workers might
have an opportunity to report problems, the threshold problem is much the
same as under the traditional regulatory system. Monitors may, however,
lower the marginal cost associated with worker exercise of rights, particu-
larly if they provide a “shield” against discrimination if workers bring la-
bor standards violations to their attention. The degree to which they play
this role has, in large part, to do with the speciﬁc monitoring protocols ne-
gotiated between manufacturers, monitors, and the government. Examin-
ing how diﬀerent types of protocols aﬀect the exercise of rights and imple-
mentation of regulations presents an important area for future study.
1.3.6 Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems
On the surface, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems may not
seem to ﬁt the description of an emerging labor market institution in that
ADR describes a process of resolving disputes arising under workplace
regulation rather than being a workplace entity per se. It has been used in
a variety of forums, but ADR is discussed here in its speciﬁc use as a means
for resolving employment disputes arising under labor statutes through
mediation, arbitration, or some combination of the two (for an overview of
the use of ADR in this capacity and others, see Lipsky and Seeber 1998;
Dunlop and Zack 1997, 2001).
Under ADR, an employee seeks recourse to a problem such as discrim-
ination via an internal mediation or arbitration procedure rather than
through the relevant agency or via the courts. Because these procedures are
administered within the company and predominately rely, at least at initial
stages, on mediation, disputes can in theory be resolved more rapidly.16
Two major Supreme Court decisions, the Gilmer decision of 1991 and
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15. Where monitoring has been adopted out of strictly voluntary agreements and lacking
the “teeth” of government sanctions, such as the right to embargo goods, the identiﬁcation of
third-party monitors with regulatory objectives will be far weaker. This raises one of the lim-
itations of using third-party monitors in the international arena to police labor standards
where there is no comparable government authority underlying the agreements. Third-party
monitors in the international labor standards arena are discussed in Elliott and Freeman
(2003).
16. Lipsky and Seeber (1998) report that 87 percent of ADR processes of the Fortune 1000
corporations that they sampled used mediation at least once in the prior three years.the Circuit City decision in 2001 raise the stakes of ADR as a means of re-
solving such claims.17 Both Gilmer and Circuit City extend the Federal Ar-
bitration Act from its historic focus on commercial disputes to those in-
volving employment contracts. Speciﬁcally, they support the right of an
employer to require employees to sign prehire agreements compelling
them to use company-sponsored dispute resolution (usually arbitration)
for statutory disputes rather than using the administrative channels estab-
lished in the legislation (as described in table 1.1). In eﬀect, employees
forgo their right to pursue such claims through administrative channels as
a condition of employment.18
Not surprisingly, the Gilmer and Circuit City decisions led to increases
in the use of ADR for employment disputes. The use of ADR under these
circumstances is controversial, most notably because of doubts that em-
ployees will receive a fair hearing in company-sponsored arbitration or
other ADR systems. In fact, many companies in the immediate wake of
Gilmer adopted arbitration procedures that were decidedly tilted toward
the employer in that companies unilaterally chose the arbitrator, estab-
lished rules of procedure (including barring formal depositions or even
written records of the arbitration), and held the right to unilaterally change
those procedures.19 In response to the employer bias of many post-Gilmer
ADR systems, a number of the institutions drawn upon by companies to
serve in arbitration proceedings (including the American Association of
Arbitrators and the American Bar Association) created a “Due Process
Protocol,” which establishes that signatory associations and their members
will only serve as arbitrators in systems that adhere to basic conditions of
procedural fairness.20
If the “Due Process Protocol” is able to assure the fairness of such pro-
ceedings in nonunion workplaces, does establishing internal procedures
for mediation and/or arbitration of statutory disputes provide a solution to
the rights problem portrayed in ﬁgure 1.1? On one hand, ADR can be seen
34 David Weil
17. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
18. In a more recent Supreme Court decision than Circuit City, EEOC v. Waﬄe House, Ind.,
(534 U.S. 279 [2002]), the Supreme Court held that an individual employee’s assent to a pre-
employment arbitration agreement did not preclude the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) from bringing its own enforcement actions against an employer, in-
cluding seeking remedies for individual workers. Although the ruling does not overturn Cir-
cuit City, it does underscore an agency’s continued interest and ability to seek its own actions
on behalf of workers in enforcing statutes like the ADA.
19. See, for example, “Some Employees Lose Right to Sue for Bias at Work,” New York
Times, March 18, 1994, A1.
20. Among those conditions, the Due Process Protocol speciﬁes that the arbitration system
provide employees with a right to representation in proceedings and a right to participate in
the selection of an arbitrator or mediator drawn from “a demographically diverse panel of
trained mediators and arbitrators” (Dunlop and Zack 2001, 6). The Due Process Protocol has
been adopted by a wide variety of institutions drawn on by companies for arbitration.as a means of lowering the marginal cost of exercise of rights in that it
makes (potentially) the cost for the disputant lower than under the tradi-
tional system where workers must press their own claims under various
federal labor statutes. By lowering the costs of exercise, the gap depicted in
ﬁgure 1.1 narrows.
On the other hand, the use of ADR by parties in nonunion workplaces
presupposes that an employee comes forward with a claim. Yet the exis-
tence of an internal procedure (and the requirement to use that system via
prehire agreement) does not inherently create an agent for those employ-
ees.21 The fact that the procedure is governed by the employer rather than
a third party (i.e., the government) may further dampen the extent to which
workers collectively might pursue a claim involving more widespread vio-
lations of a statutory right.
As a result, ADR may be most beneﬁcial in those cases where the diver-
gence between individual and workplace marginal beneﬁts is relatively
small, such as in resolving disputes arising under workers compensation or
very speciﬁc claims under statutes like FLSA or ERISA. But in many ar-
eas of workplace regulation—particularly regarding workplace discrimi-
nation that has motivated many nonunion companies to adopt internal
arbitration systems22—ADR by itself does not solve the public goods prob-
lem. However, it remains to be seen if the growth of ADR potentially fueled
by the Circuit City decision will induce existing institutions (e.g., labor
unions, workers’ rights groups, law ﬁrms) to serve a new role as third-party
representatives within nonunion ﬁrms. If existing or new players move into
this representation role, ADR processes may prove an important venue for
the exercise of employment rights.
1.4 Concluding Thoughts and Implications
It is easy for politicians, or reformers, or trade union oﬃcials to boast of
the laws which they have secured for labor, and it is just as easy to over-
look the details, or appropriations, or competent oﬃcials that are
needed to make them enforceable.
–Commons and Andrews 1936, 448
Can emerging labor market institutions play the role of collective agent
in a workplace that draws heavily upon the exercise of individual rights for
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21. Note that this argument also supports the use of ADR in cases where some form of
worker representative is already present, such as in unionized workplaces. Here, ADR can
lead to more speedy and cost-eﬀective resolution of statutory disputes at the same time that
workers’ interests are protected through third-party representation.
22. The Gilmer case involved a case of age discrimination under Federal law; Circuit City
involved a charge of discrimination because of sexual preference under state law; Waﬄe
House, Inc. arose from a discrimination claim under the ADA.implementation? Are there emerging labor market institutions that plausi-
bly can take up this role where labor unions are not present?
Table 1.3 summarizes the analysis of the ability of the alternative work-
place institutions surveyed previously to do so. An implication of the fore-
going analysis is that it may be diﬃcult for a single institution to play the
varied roles required of a collective agent across a range of workplace reg-
ulations. In particular, absent a labor union, it is diﬃcult to devise an insti-
tutional arrangement that eﬀectively aligns its interests with those of the
workforce and at the same time has the kind of access to the workplace
necessary to act upon those interests. Nonetheless, table 1.3 suggests that
a mixed approach, incorporating diﬀerent institutions for diﬀerent areas of
regulation, might help to close the gap arising in implementation of work-
place regulations. Posed in this way, the policy question shifts from a focus
on the agent per se and to the functions that must be performed to assure
that the objectives of workplace regulations are achieved. For example, one
set of policy options revolves around reducing the marginal cost of exercise
of rights. This might include ﬁnding new means of making workers aware
of their statutory rights or reducing the perceived cost of exercise by im-
proving protections against employer discrimination (e.g., administrative
procedures that protect employees’ identity in the case of triggering in-
spections). Recent eﬀorts by OSHA to create an extensive “workers’ page”
on their website provides one example of interventions of this type. The
page includes instructions on ﬁling a complaint with OSHA (including
downloadable complaint forms), information about statutory coverage,
employee rights, and health and safety standards.23
Another range of policy options involves creating incentives to foster
new workplace institutions that might provide some of the core functions
of a collective agent. One approach would be to restructure aspects of reg-
ulatory systems to create incentives on the regulated parties themselves to
fashion agents (such as private monitors) that provide at least some of the
functions of collective agents. One example of this type of policy described
previously is the DOL’s apparel enforcement strategy that induces man-
ufacturers to create third-party monitors to oversee the activities of sub-
contractors.
Alternatively, public policies might assist existing labor market institu-
tions sharpen their abilities to undertake the central aspects as collective
agents. Policy proposals in this vein include improving the access that
public interest groups and other institutions have to employees at work-
places, thereby enhancing their potential role as third-party representa-
tives in ADR systems. By improving employee access to potential outside
representation, ADR systems (which will undoubtedly become even more
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23. The “Workers’ Page” can be found at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/worker/index.html.prevalent in the wake of the Circuit City decision), will be better prepared
to deal with systemic workplace problems. Developing a more robust set of
institutions capable of representing nonunion workers in such company-
based mediation and arbitration procedures may prove an important new
means of improving the exercise of individual rights in nonunion work-
places.
Many of the emerging institutions discussed in subsequent chapters are
beginning to play at least some of the central roles for labor market regu-
lation discussed above. A central analytic question, then, is whether they
can be expected to develop over time to prove eﬀective and sustainable col-
lective agents given their diﬀerent institutional forms, incentives, and
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Address the  cost of  Protect  Comments on 
Labor market  public goods  exercise  against worker  eﬀectiveness of 
institution problem? of rights? discrimination? workplace institution
Labor unions  Yes Yes Yes See table 1.2 for empirical results
(benchmark)
National issue  No No No Agency problems limit role to 
organizations precedent-setting cases
Legal service  No Partially No Agency problems limit role to 
organizations individual advocacy
Other public-interest  No Yes Partially Largest impact in assisting 
organizations  workers in receiving beneﬁts 
(e.g., COSH/disabled  (e.g., workers compensation)
workers advocacy 
organizations)
Mandated workplace  Yes/No Yes Yes/No Eﬀectiveness is function of 
committees nature of the mandate and an-
tecedent conditions in the work-
place (e.g., size, workforce 
turnover)
Third-party monitors  ? Yes Partially Monitors agency relationship 
(e.g., FLSA) with third party and government 
creates a role as supplementary 
enforcement resource
Alternative dispute  No Yes ? Most eﬀective where divergence 
resolution systems of private and workplace bene-
ﬁts from exercise of rights is 
small
Note: ?   eﬀect unclear.activities. A full answer to this question requires observing these institu-
tions as they evolve over the next decade.
Commons and Andrews (1936) recognized at the dawn of the modern
era of workplace regulation that enactment of labor regulations did not as-
sure implementation. Along with guaranteeing that the agencies vested
with enforcement or administrative authority receive adequate appropria-
tions and are staﬀed with competent personnel, this essay underscores the
need to develop complementary institutions in the labor market to assure
full implementation. Creating and fostering the institutions capable of tak-
ing on these functions may prove to be one of the most challenging aspects
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